









1. Renewable Energy and East Asia

1.1 Introducing Renewable Energy

Renewable energy (RE) is derived from replenishable natural processes, sources or phenomena, such as wind, solar, hydropower, geothermal, waves, tides, and biological matter. They are ‘renewable’ in actual or theoretical terms because they can provide inexhaustible supplies of energy to meet the needs of humankind. In contrast, fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, coal) and nuclear energy (based on uranium) are non-renewable because they essentially derive from depletable mineral resources. Today, we often refer to renewables in terms of their technological applications, among the most common being wind turbines, solar modules or panels, tidal barrages, biofuels, and so on. These can vary enormously in terms of scale, for example from small solar photovoltaic cells generating a few watts of electricity to power electronic devices such as calculators to huge hydropower dams that provide power to millions of households through national grid systems. Renewable energy technologies can hence be deployed on a micro-scale, where individuals and local communities own installations and are both producer and consumer, and on a macro-scale in which RE plants and products serve the energy needs of large parts of the country, or indeed the whole country. In addition to the environmental virtues of renewable energy, its micro-scale applications are also making an important contribution to reducing global energy poverty (IPCC 2011). Roughly 1.5 billion people currently do not have access to electricity, and many more only have access to unstable supplies of it (REN21 2013). Wind, solar, bioenergy and small-hydro in particular have scope for deployment in remote areas located far from national grid infrastructure, thus helping improve livelihoods by sustainable methods by providing power for schools, hospitals, small enterprises, communications and other utility services. Renewables have played an important part in the rural electrification programmes of many East Asian countries.

Renewable energy is arguably the main element of a broader ‘green energy’ cluster of technologies that additionally includes energy efficiency and saving, electric vehicles, fuel cells and other eco-industry sectors. The ability of renewables to produce cleaner forms of energy makes them crucial to decarbonising economic activity, achieving sustainable development and tackling climate change. This is especially relevant to East Asia given that no other part of the world is making, and will continue to make, as big an impact on climate change and global energy security. The region is also the world’s most important production hub and is experiencing rapid urbanisation, and thus where much of the planet’s most carbon-intensive activity is concentrated. East Asia’s demand for energy across all fields – electricity power generation, transportation, and thermal heat – has grown almost three times faster than the global average since the 1970s, and currently accounts for around a third of the world total. This is set to rise further still. Renewable energy in East Asia is thus not only critical to the region’s future sustainable development but also globally.


BOX 1.1   Energy Units of Measurement and Statistics

Many readers may not be familiar with energy units of measurements and their use when studying renewable energy. Starting with a simple example, most households in developed countries would need a 2 to 4 kilowatt (kW) solar photovoltaic (PV) rooftop based system to cover all of its daytime electricity demands, this figure being notably lower in developing countries. Small-scale renewable energy devices used at this level tend to be rated in kW. Larger installations or equipment operated normally by companies at the power plant level, such as wind farms and solar parks, are invariably rated in megawatt (MW) terms, 1MW equalling 1,000kW. In certain cases, very large RE plants, like hydropower dams, may have gigawatt (GW) scale generation ratings but most often this unit of power is used when examining industry, national or international capacity levels. A single GW is equal to a thousand MW, and a terawatt (TW) a thousand GW. 





1.2 East Asia: An Economic and Energy Profile

East Asia comprises two sub-regions, Northeast Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia) and Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). Over the last five or six decades East Asia has been the world’s most dynamic and fastest growing economic region. Annual double-digit percent increases in economic growth have not been uncommon for many East Asia countries during this period. Table 1.1 reveals how the region consists of a diverse set of economies that together accounted for 25.7 percent of the global economy in 2012, a higher share than both the European Union (23.3 percent) and the United States (21.9 percent). It is also the world’s second most integrated regional economy after the EU (Dent 2008, 2010). Current projections suggest that East Asia’s global economic importance will continue to grow into the 21st century if the growth trajectories of China and the region’s other ‘tiger economies’ are maintained. 

Significant increases in energy use in most parts of the region have been caused by rapid industrial development, rising incomes and expanding populations. Manufacturing has been core to the development strategies of East Asia’s largest economies, resulting in carbon-intensive economic growth. Overall, East Asia’s energy use over doubled from 1990 to 2010, from 1,739 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe) to 3,888 mtoe during a time when world energy use only rose by a half in comparison (Table 1.1). China accounted for much of these increases regionally and globally, reaching 2,417 mtoe in 2010 and thus surpassing the United States as the world’s largest national energy consumer. Even more dramatic rises have occurred in East Asia’s electricity grid capacity, quadrupling from 391.7GW to 1,578.9GW during the same 20-year period, doubling the region’s global share from 14.7 percent to 31.2 percent. However, while China’s and other East Asian countries’ energy use per capita level has risen notably over recent decades, they remain well below those of the US and EU. Looking at GDP per unit of energy use figures in Table 1.1 as a general proxy for energy efficiency, we can see that countries such as China, Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam have made significant improvements but they still have some distance to go before attaining the same standards as developed nations. Together with renewable energy, energy efficiency is the other key field of East Asia’s green energy industry, and also a core element of most climate change strategies.

Around three-quarters of aggregated greenhouse gases derive from energy use (IPCC 2011). The combination of burgeoning energy demand and still relatively low energy efficiency levels has steadily increased East Asia’s impact on global carbon emissions and climate change. Over 1990 to 2010, the region saw its carbon emission level over double from 4,638 million tonnes (20.8 percent of the world total) to 11,622 (34.6 percent). Carbon emission per capita rates have correspondingly risen among the region’s fastest growing developing economies although these continue to below those Western levels, e.g. China’s being still around three times lower than the US. Let us use an illustrative example to help explain the relevance of renewable energy in combating historic increases in carbon emissions. Based on average power ratings, wind energy typically generates around 2.5GWh per/1MW installed capacity​[1]​ over the course of a year (see Box 1). Using also a generalised world average, each gigawatt hour (GWh) of clean energy produced yields an estimated 600 tonnes reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (GWEC 2009). Thus, electricity generated by a 100MW wind farm would annually led a nominal average 150,000 tonnes CO2 saving, or the equivalent emissions produced on a yearly average basis in 2010 by 24,194 individuals collectively in China, 20,000 in the EU, or 8,523 people in the US (see Table 1.1). 


1.3 Main Drivers of Renewable Energy Development in East Asia

East Asia’s economic and energy profile provides the context for the three main inter-related drivers behind renewable energy development in the region, the first being environmental and sustainable development imperatives. High carbon economic activity is causing acute pollution and other environmental problems in East Asia and correspondingly adverse social welfare effects on its societies. When compared to other parts of the world its energy-intensive development structures appear especially unsustainable. East Asian nations are also highly vulnerable to the climate change risks of extreme weather and rising sea-levels. In addition to local and national pressures to establish cleaner energy systems, many governments in the region are under growing international pressure on this front due to East Asia’s growing impact on global climate change. 

The second main driver is energy security, which can be understood in simple conceptual terms as addressing supply risk (securing reliable sources of energy fuels), price risk (maintaining predictable or at least stable energy prices) and environmental risk (mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of energy use), as discussed under the first main driver. The promotion of renewable energy in East Asia can too be explained in relation to the first two risk types. Sustained high growth rates in energy demand has led to a rapid depletion of the region’s own fossil fuel deposits, and many of its countries have moved to or are moving towards a net energy importing position. Table 1.1 also shows that East Asia’s most advanced economies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore – these also being among the largest) have chronically high energy import dependency ratios, making them especially susceptible to the vicissitudes of foreign supply sources (Dent 2013a). This is potentially further compounded by volatility in international prices for oil, gas and coal. Renewables have the advantage of being inherently indigenous energy sources, hence providing a long-term solution to foreign energy supply risk. Although some RE sectors are prone to occasional commodity price spikes (e.g. polysilicon and solar PV cell manufacturing), they have been historically less exposed to price risk than fossil fuel sectors.





1.4 The Approach and Structure of this Book

This book makes a comprehensive study of East Asia renewable energy sectors from perspectives of government economic policies and strategies, business and industry development, techno-innovation and production, socio-technical issues, international political economy, multi-level governance and institutionalism. It main argument is that the expansion of renewable energy in East Asia forms an integral part of the region’s ‘new developmentalism’, which can be defined as revitalised and refocused forms of state capacity aimed at realising the transformative economic objectives associated with low carbon development. Chapter 2 presents an analytical framework of new developmentalism that fuses the theories of state capacity and ecological modernisation to explain the broader context in which the region’s renewable energy development has occurred. In the meantime, this introductory chapter gives an overview of recent trends in renewable energy, looking at key matters such as:

	evolution of renewables in the world’s energy systems
	brief introductions to RE sectors
	investment and finance
	challenges, constraints and contentious issues
	techno-innovation and production
	international political economy issues such global competition, trade barriers and disputes, and rare earths and other resource dependencies
	governance and institutionalism of renewable energy development at the national, global-multilateral and regional levels





2. Renewables in the World’s Energy Systems

2.1 Historic and Contemporary Perspectives

While renewable energy use has expanded considerably in recent years it continues to represent a relatively small fraction of global energy production and consumption. Today’s energy structures remain strongly dominated by the fossil fuel industries of oil, natural gas and coal. Significant structural and technical changes in the world’s energy systems can take many decades to occur, this being relevant to the decarbonising of global economic activity generally. Although renewables are seen by the majority as the most important destination energy sources, most parts of the world will remain highly dependent on oil, coal and gas as transition fuels for many decades to come. 

Renewable energy technologies have existed for centuries and in some cases millennia. Human societies around the world have devised ingenious and different ways to harness natural phenomena as sources of energy. Mechanical hydropower (water mills) played a vital part in the birth of the Industrial Revolution around 250 years ago, and later on hydroelectric technology contributed significantly to powering the earliest national electricity grids that were established from the late 19th century onwards. However, modern industrial development has been largely dependent on fossil fuel consumption, and the inexorable rise of carbon-based economies became one of the 20th century’s defining features. Experiments with certain non-hydro renewables (e.g. wind, solar) were being undertaken over this time but not until the early 1970s did the range of RE technologies we know today begin to emerge. Governments then turned to renewables in response to both growing concerns over the long-term adverse environmental impacts of industrialism and the energy security challenges arising from the 1973/74 oil crisis. Despite the crisis helping initiate many modern RE policies worldwide, non-hydro renewable energy made limited inroads into national energy systems up to the 1990s. Governments invested far more substantially in the nuclear power industry during this period. 

It was not until the early or mid-2000s that significant growth and development in renewables began as new RE technologies became scaled up and approached commercialisation. Wind, solar and bioenergy deserve special mention here, and electricity generation is arguably where renewables have made the biggest impact on global energy systems. Worldwide renewables power generation capacity has risen from 889GW in 2005 to 1,561GW by 2013 (Table 1.2), which according to REN21 (2014) represents 26.4 percent of global total (up from 21.6 percent in 2005), leading in addition to a rising share of global electricity generation consumption or output from 15.6 percent to 22.1 percent. As Table 1.2 indicates, hydropower accounted for 16.9 percent of global electricity generation capacity in 2013, this being around three-quarters of the total renewables contribution. In terms of global primary energy demand, renewables accounted for 19.0 percent of the total in 2012, with traditional biomass accounting for a large (9.0 percent total primary energy demand) but gradually diminishing share, and mainly related to cooking and heating in developing countries. 

East Asia has been at the forefront of the recent global expansion of renewable energy. Table 1.1 shows for example that by 2010 the region was responsible for 319.3GW (26.0 percent) of total world electricity generated by renewables, more than the EU (246.GW, 20.0 percent) and almost double the US level (144GW, 11.7 percent). East Asia’s installed RE capacity level continues to rise faster than any other global region in absolute terms. By 2013, East Asia’s total renewables power generation capacity was 457GW, and its global share had risen to 29.2 percent.​[2]​ Furthermore, China’s installed RE power capacity (379GW by 2013) is greater than any other nation by far​[3]​ – and has added around 40 percent of new additions to global renewable energy capacity since the late 2000s (REN21 2010, 2014). On a similar vein, China is now the largest manufacturer of renewable energy products, helping make them more affordable worldwide. However, as we later discuss, the impressive growth of renewables in East Asia has not been without notable controversy, such as the environmental and also socio-economic problems arising from hydropower development. In addition, renewable energy shares of total electricity generation are not that high in East Asia’s most developed economies (Table 1.1). Moreover, the relatively high share figures for many of the region’s developing countries often depend heavily on singular sectors (e.g. Laos, Myanmar and North Korea on hydropower; Indonesia and Philippines on geothermal) while some smaller economies (Brunei, Hong Kong and Macau) have virtually or actually no renewables power generation capacity. 

Furthermore, fossil fuels are likely to remain dominant in the worldwide energy mix for some time to come. Table 1.2 shows these accounted for 67.3 percent of global electricity generation capacity in 2013, and a net increase of 1,120GW over the 2005-2013 period compared to 672GW for renewables. Many East Asian countries plan to continue expanding their coal and gas fired power capacity simultaneously to pursuing ambitious renewable energy strategies. Nuclear power meanwhile has been a relatively static energy industry over the last decade or so, and in more recent years been one in general decline globally. In 2002, total world nuclear power capacity stood at 362GW from 444 reactors, rising by just 13GW by 2010 at a total capacity of 375GW that year. However, this level fell slightly to 373GW and 435 reactors worldwide by June 2014.​[4]​ Most of this drop is attributable to Japan’s post-Fukushima energy policy but many of the world’s 31 nuclear power producing countries have also been decommissioning old reactors and plants and not replacing them (Schneider and Froggatt 2013). Only four East Asian economies have nuclear power capacity: Japan (38.0GW in 2013), South Korea (20.7GW), China (13.8GW) and Taiwan (5.0GW). Although there are plans in East Asia to construct new reactors in the future (China 28 and South Korea 4), renewables have nevertheless gained ground over nuclear as the most viable long-term alternative energy source to fossil fuels. By the mid-2010s the combined installed generation capacity of solar and wind energy alone was greater than that of nuclear power​[5]​ (Table 1.2). Momentum for renewables power generation is growing: RE sectors together accounted for over 50 percent of all investment in new generation capacity worldwide from 2008 to 2013 (REN21 2014), up from an estimated 20 to 25 percent share enjoyed by renewables in the early 2000s (REN21 2006). 


2.2 Renewable Energy Sectors

Renewable energy comprises a broad spectrum of notably different technologies, and the growth patterns and dynamics of each have in turn varied very significantly over recent years as each of the sector-specific sections below detail:

	Hydropower: the oldest and most established mainstream renewables sector and by far the most dominant concerning power generation. It is mature energy technology with a relatively slow rate of annual growth (just 3.7 percent over 2008-2013) but nevertheless has still made the second largest contribution to additional RE capacity over recent years. Total hydropower capacity had reached 1,000GW worldwide by 2013 (REN21 2014). China’s ambitious dam construction programme has been a central factor in the sector’s development globally, responsible for roughly half of recent new additional hydropower capacity worldwide. The country’s total capacity had risen from 117.4GW in 2005 to 260.2GW by 2013, 26.0 percent of the world total. Hydropower has also figured highly in Southeast Asia’s RE plans. However, serious environmental and socio-economic costs arising from large-hydro projects in East Asia and globally have highlighted the need for shifting future sector development more towards small-hydro applications.
	Wind energy: is the largest non-hydro RE sector and one of the fastest growing, recording an average annual capacity expansion rate of 21 percent during 2008-2013, and adding more installed new capacity to the renewables total than any other sector in recent years (Table 1.2). In 2000, total global wind energy capacity stood at just 18.0GW, rising to 74.1GW in 2006 and 318.1GW by 2013 (GWEC 2014). China has made by far the most substantial contribution globally, overtaking the United States in 2010 as the world’s leading nation on installed capacity terms and dwarfing the contributions made by other East Asian states. East Asia is also the world’s largest manufacturing region of wind turbines in an industry where Chinese firms are again having a profound impact.
	Solar photovoltaic (PV): the fastest expanding mainstream renewable energy sector for the last decade or so, with an annual average growth rate of 55 percent over 2008-2013. Installed capacity was just 1.5GW in 2000, rising to 5.4GW by 2005 and then to 138.9GW by 2013 (EPIA 2011a, 2014). While Europe still dominates with well over a half of total global capacity, the rapid ascendance of China’s solar PV industry and a recent Japanese resurgence on installation has helped turned around East Asia’s recent falling share. Japanese and Korean firms are also amongst the sector’s most important technology leaders. Like wind energy, the impressive expansion of solar PV is primarily based on dynamic techno-innovation that has significantly improved cost efficiency and technical performance.
	Bioenergy: concerns unlocking the latent chemical energy found in biological matter. Biomass power generation capacity reached an estimated 88.0GW globally by 2013, almost double the 2005 level of 44GW (Table 1.2). The US and the EU (especially Germany, Sweden and Britain) remain the major players, although China and Japan are ranked fourth and fifth respectfully. Biofuels have also experienced significant recent growth, and accounted for 2-3 percent of total road transportation fuels by the early 2010s. Bioethanol production increased from 33 billion litres in 2005 to 87 billion litres by 2013, the US and Brazil duopolising the sub-sector with global shares of 58 percent and 29 percent respectively, with China positioned third globally, producing 2.0 billion litres in 2013, and Thailand ranked fifth with 1.0 billion litres. The much smaller biodiesel fuel sub-sector has grown as similar fast rates, rising from 4 billion litres of production in 2005 to 26 billion litres by 2013. Indonesia is the highest globally ranked East Asian producer with 2.0 billion litres (sixth), Thailand ranked eighth with 1.1 billion litres. As noted above, traditional uses of biomass for heat and cooking represents a large share of renewables contribution to global primary energy demand.
	Geothermal: has remained a relatively small and static renewable energy sector, growing at only 3.2 percent per annum on average over 2008-2013 and with just 12.0GW installed electricity capacity by 2013. Rates of techno-innovation and investment growth have been slow. There were, however, at least 78 countries using geothermal energy for heat generation of some kind, and 24 countries with installed geothermal power plants for electricity generation: the Philippines (1.8GW) and Indonesia (1.3GW) were ranked second and third respectively behind the US (3.4GW), while Japan was ranked eighth (0.5GW). Direct use geothermal energy for water heating (i.e. non electricity generation) has risen by an annual average of around 9 percent from 2000, reaching a worldwide total energy output of 91.0TWh by 2013 (IGA 2014, REN21 2011, 2013, 2014). 
	Concentrating solar power (CSP): currently a micro-scale sector but with notable growth potential. Over 2008-2013 it has experienced an annual average growth rate of 48 percent, global installed capacity rising from 354MW in 2005 to 3,425MW by 2013. The increasing number of current large-scale investments in CSP plants across the world (mostly in Spain and a lesser extent the United States) should lead to continued rapid growth, although its presence in East Asia remains low (REN21 2014). By 2013, China had installed 10MW of a 50MW CSP plant, giving it a global ninth rank on capacity, while tenth ranked Thailand had been operating a singular 5MW plant since 2011.
	Solar heating and cooling: this third solar energy sub-sector primarily concerns solar water heaters (SWH). Global solar heating (sometimes referred to as solar thermal) capacity had increased to 283GWth by 2012 and of this SWH accounted for 258GWth. China has been responsible for over 80 percent of new additional capacity in recent years and currently hosts around two-thirds of global installed SWH capacity. It also manufactures around three-quarters of global SWH production. Japan is the only other notable East Asia country in this field with 1.1 percent of world SWH capacity in 2012 and globally ranked ninth (REN21 2014). There has been fast growth in the solar space heating and cooling applications worldwide but these remain small sectors of activity. 
	Ocean energy: this may be considered a micro-sector still based primarily on experimental technologies. Installed global capacity was just 535.5MW by 2012, of which 519.6MW came from the small number of tidal range barrages currently in operation, another 8.8MW from test-bed tidal current turbines, and 7.1MW from a handful of wave energy devices installed across a few countries (Ernst & Young 2013, OES 2013). The most significant recent development in the sector by far was South Korea’s 254MW Sihwa Lake tidal power station that became operational in August 2011, surpassing France’s 240MW Rance tidal barrage as the world’s largest tidal power plant. South Korea has plans to complete other large plants by 2017 that could boost its national ocean energy capacity level to around 3GW. China has hitherto installed much smaller tidal and wave energy devices while Japan, Taiwan and some Southeast Asian nations are also testing prototype technologies in this field. 

To summarise, the patterns and stages of renewable energy development varies considerably across the different sectors. Some are well established and relatively unchanged in their current technical form (hydropower, traditional bioenergy), some have experienced strong techno-innovatory development leading to scaled up commercialisation and impressive growth (solar PV, wind energy and biomass power generation), others have conversely remained relatively static (geothermal and tidal energy), or have achieved comparatively modest advances (biofuels), and some are still micro-sectors (concentrated solar power, ocean energy) or at the experimental stages of development such as wave energy and solar cooling technologies. 


2.3 Investment and Finance 

The rapid growth of renewable energy’s more dynamic sectors such as wind and solar can be largely explained by increasing levels of public and private sector investment that has helped improve their commercial viability. Annual global investment in renewables (excluding the large hydropower and SWH sectors) steadily increased from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, from around US$7 billion in 1995, to US$14 billion in 2000, and then to US$64.8 billion in 2005. This rapid growth pattern continued thereafter, with annual investment levels peaking in 2011 at US$279.6 billion and then falling back somewhat to US$214.4 in the 2013 year. If large-hydro (estimated at US$35.5 billion in 2013) and SWHs (estimated at US$8.0 billion, 2012 figure) were included this level would be still higher. The very recent decline in renewables investment can be mainly explained by lack of policy certainty in Europe, redirected investment into unconventional or shale gas and also that the significant advance of cost efficiencies and market competitiveness in solar PV and wind energy have reduced the need for state subsidy investment in these sectors. Furthermore, this was the fifth consecutive year that, with regard to on net additions to power generation capacity, global investment in renewables exceeded those of fossil fuels.​[6]​ Solar energy emerged as the dominant RE sector for new investment in the early 2010s with US$113.7 billion (96 percent of this was solar PV) and wind energy was second with US$80.1 billion that year, together these two sectors accounting for 90.4 percent of that year’s total, this combined share having steadily risen over time, from just over half the same total back in the mid-2000s (REN21 2005, 2006, 2012, 2014; UNEP 2011).

Concerning investment type, a majority share (62.2 percent, US$133.4 billion in 2013) is attributable to asset finance of utility-scale, infrastructural projects such as wind farms and solar parks. Much of this investment is sourced from national and international development banks, for example the China Development Bank and the World Bank Group. According to Pew Charitable Trusts (2011), asset financing has been especially relevant in East Asian countries, and most notably those such as China and South Korea that have embarked on ambitious strategic plans on RE sector development as part of their new ‘green’ stimulus packages in the wake of the 2008/09 global financial crisis (Chapter 2). Meanwhile, investment in small-scale distributed capacity (e.g. residential solar PV) was 27.9 percent (US$59.9 billion) of the 2013 total, solar PV being the most important beneficiary. Investment in small-scale renewables generally has been particularly robust in recent years, indicative of growing societal support. Other types of RE investment include public market investment and research and development, and additionally venture capital that have been a particularly important investment method in the US. 





3. Key Challenges, Constraints and Contentious Issues

Notwithstanding the impressive growth figures surveyed above, significant challenges lay ahead for substantially developing renewable energy in East Asia and globally into the 21st century. Generally speaking, this development will entail considerable structural changes to incumbent systems of energy production, distribution and consumption. As energy underpins many if not most forms of economic activity, the greater use of renewables would also shape key aspects of the economy, as well as relationships between economic agents. For example, increasingly affordable RE equipment (e.g. solar PV, bioenergy) has made individuals and local communities more energy independent and self-sufficient, creating so called ‘prosumers’ – those who both produce and consume their own electricity and thermal power, thus largely negating the need for energy supply companies. However, transformative changes of this kind require society to trust renewables to securely and predictably meet their energy needs, as well as make necessary adjustments to economic habits and practices. There are hence important socio-technical issues to consider when scaling up the use of renewables. In this context, the following key constraints and contentious issues should be considered:

	Intermittent power problems: the rated power of an energy installation, such as a 5MW wind turbine, is its technical or theoretical maximum power output. However, on-shore wind turbines normally operate at 20 to 40 percent of their ‘rated power’ capacity due to wind frequency patterns. Similarly, solar energy only generates power during daytime hours, and ocean power is dependent on wind speeds, currents and tidal movements. Hence, estimated power generation levels expressed by time-period (e.g. GWh per annum) are essential for gauging the actual (not just the potential) power produced by a renewable energy installation. Hence, a well located 2MW wind turbine can produce more energy overall than a much larger one placed in a low wind speed site. The intermittent power problem is essentially one of unreliable supply, and relates closely to the second constraint that follows.
	Non-dispatchability and capacity factor ratings: dispatchable sources of electricity generation are those able to immediately respond to fluctuations in energy demand from power grids. This is not possible for renewables such as wind, solar and ocean energy given their generation intermittencies noted above. However, hydropower, geothermal and bioenergy are not faced with this problem due to them offering constant energy streams like fossil fuels and nuclear. Due to intermittency and non-dispatchable issues, wind, solar and ocean energy are likely to remain complementary to dispatchable forms of power generation. Furthermore, nuclear plants work at similar high operating efficiency levels as hydropower dams, normally having a 90 percent or above capacity factor rating. Thus, a 100MW nuclear power station can produce similar or even greater amounts of generated power as a 300MW rated wind farm (see Box 1). 
	Infrastructural issues: scaling up most types of renewables present important challenges to existing energy infrastructures. The future expansion of a prosumer market in for example solar PV will require grids to switch from being traditionally one-way energy transmission systems to essentially two-way systems. Moreover, renewables bring a much greater diversity of sources to energy infrastructures that have to be accommodated and integrated into existing systems, such as wind farms located in remote areas far from the nearest grid network point. Problems often arise regarding who pays for this new infrastructure development. 
	Environmental and sustainability predicaments: all energy systems including renewables are in some way materially based, and require material processes to produce installation equipment. Consequently, no RE technology is completely carbon-neutral, or in an absolute pure sense completely ‘renewable’ as most materials on which they depend are depletable. Wind turbines are made from steel and other metals, requiring substantial concrete foundations and transportation fuels to move their components from point of manufacture to site location. According to the CCICED (2011), the 20GW or so added new installed wind capacity in China required the equivalent of about 2 percent of Chinese steel production that same year. Solar PV module production involves the use of various chemicals and mineral resources. Many of these resources are highly sought after, for instance lithium, polysilicon, silver and gallium for solar PV cells, and rare earth minerals like neodymium for wind turbine magnets. Some RE installations cause their own localised environmental problems, such as ecological damage arising hydropower dam construction and operation, emissions from bioenergy combustion, and visibility and noise nuisances related to wind farms. They can additionally have land-intensive requirements, such as wind farms and solar parks, presenting spatial constraint challenges.






4. Techno-Innovation and Production

Renewable energy sectors differ considerably not only in terms of their scale and development but also regarding techno-innovation. Some may be considered relatively mature technologies (e.g. hydropower, geothermal), others still largely experimental and as yet unproven (e.g. wave energy) while wind energy and solar PV specifically are viewed as mainstream energy sources with high rates of techno-innovation and R&D investment. The principal technological improvements in wind energy centre on the increasing size of turbines, their corresponding higher power ratings, improved technical and production efficiencies (Chapter 4). Arguably more impressive advances have been achieved in the solar PV industry, which is now the most commercially competitive renewables sector in many parts of the world. From 2008 to 2013, PV system costs well over halved while the cell efficiency ratings have steadily risen. Advances in second and third generation PV are providing wider choice for installing solar energy applications, such as integrating them into building fabrics (Chapter 5). Both wind and solar energy industries have also benefitted technologically from their respective close links with other high-tech industry clusters. In wind energy’s case, this includes nanotechnology (composite materials), aerospace (aerodynamics and advanced materials), energy storage electronics (advanced batteries) and meteorology software. Solar energy meanwhile has strong connections with advanced materials and chemicals, satellite guidance technology, electronics, lasers, and high-grade concentrators used in space technology applications. Such links have allowed firms with technological competences in related fields to develop competitive advantages in wind and solar energy, this being especially relevant to East Asia’s highly diversified companies like Daewoo, Hitachi, LG, Mitsubishi, Samsung, Sharp, Sumitomo, Sony, Toshiba, and Matsushita Electric.

Although competition in wind and solar energy has intensified worldwide, both sectors are also characterised by dense patterns of strategic alliance networks where inter-firm collaboration on new technology development is common (Zhou et al 2012). This has led to a growth in international cross-licensing agreements between renewable energy firms in which the intellectual property rights of one signatory party is extended either wholly or partly to another, consequently diffusing new technology and innovations. East Asian companies have benefitted from this technology transfer process, and especially from developing economies such as China. However, intensifying international competition has also led to companies more ardently protecting their intellectual property through registering patents. Such enforcement of intellectual property rights remains a contentious issue. On the one hand, patent regulation provides both confidence and incentive for firms to invest in new innovation. On the other hand, developing countries in particular question both the equity and efficacy of allowing firms (invariably from developed countries) to enjoy the patent-based monopolistic advantage of being the sole exploiter of new technology and innovation assets, “especially when the knowledge is essential for promoting public policy goals such as climate change mitigation and adaptation” (Lee et al 2009: 11). The expansion of compulsory licensing policies of many governments worldwide have helped reinforce the position of patent-holders in RE industries through making it mandatory for firms to adopt the latest technologies when constructing new or adapting existing installations.

Over recent years there has been a notable increase in the number of new patent registrations for wind and solar PV, both over quadrupling in number to reach around 1,400 per year globally by the late 2000s. A similar trend is evident in the bioenergy and concentrating solar power sectors (BNEF 2011, Lee et al 2009). By the early 2010s there were thought to be over 200,000 patents on RE technology, and Japanese firms have been among the world’s most active patent registers (IRENA 2013a). Chapters that follow discuss how Japan and East Asia’s other developed economies of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have hitherto adopted a clear technology-oriented approach to renewable energy development generally over the installation capacity-oriented approach preferred by China and many Southeast Asian countries. However, this distinction has recently become more blurred. Governments and companies in the region’s developing economies are now raising their ambitions on indigenous innovation in renewable energy, as revealed in recent macro-development and energy strategies, including China’s 12th Five Year Plan, Malaysia’s Green Technology Strategy and Thailand’s Alternative Energy Development Plan 2012-2021. According to an IRENA (2013b) report, Chinese firms have been particularly active in patenting new innovations in the solar PV sector. Meanwhile, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have most recently embarked on bolder plans to expand installed renewables capacity, especially in wind and solar energy.

Increased use of renewables has also been made possible from general techno-innovatory advances in energy systems. For example, the development of smart grids combines information and communication technology to electricity generation infrastructure in ways to make grids more operationally flexible and efficient, as well as better adapted to accommodate multiple sources of power generation such as rooftop solar PV (Liserre et al 2010, IEA 2011). In addition, advances in micro-grid technology offer new options for shared power generation at the local community level that have also helped encourage the deployment of small-to-medium scale renewable energy installations in various parts of East Asia, especially more remote locations. Meanwhile, new techno-innovation in the construction industry has provided more opportunities to integrate RE technology into new and existing buildings (Carbon Trust 2011).

Most RE sectors are now perceived in East Asia as relatively high-tech strategic industries, and thus the region’s governments and companies have invested in expanding their production capacities and value-chains. Chapter 2 discusses how this could be understood as a natural progression of East Asia’s progressive techno-industrial development, as well as a functional outcome of the region being the world’s largest production hub based on nurturing various sectoral competitive advantages. Over recent years, renewable energy sector manufacturing has accordingly shifted more from Europe and North America to Asia, especially to East Asia and in particular to China. In 2000, Chinese firms produced a mere 2 percent of solar PV equipment but by 2012 this figure was an estimated 63 percent: in the same year European production was just 11 percent and the US much lower at 3 percent of the global total. In 2013, nine of the world’s top ten PV module manufacturers were East Asian, six from China, two from Japan and one from South Korea (see Table 5.1, page XX??) in 2012. Also, four Chinese companies were top-ten ranked globally in wind turbine production and the country was estimated to be making around half the world’s wind energy equipment (Pew Charitable Trusts 2011). 

Dynamic entrepreneurism in China’s wind and solar PV industries was a major contributing factor to overcapacity problems both nationally and globally in the early 2010s. The mass entry of new Chinese firms into both sectors brought intense competition to the national industry and knock on effects in the international market. Many high-profile firms in Europe, Japan and the United States have gone bankrupt, drastically cut back production or have been taken over by other firms, e.g. Hanwha Solar One’s purchase of Germany’s Q-Cells, once a global market leader. Despite the fact that in 2012 alone around 50 solar PV manufacturers filed for bankruptcy in China – five times the number of their European rivals – the country continues to expand PV production capacity as surviving companies take a positive view on long-term market growth and strong government support for the sector. State-owned banks have hitherto played a key role here, for instance lending the nation’s top ten PV firms almost US$20 billion in 2012 (REN21 2013). Similar issues have arisen in the wind energy industry, where intensifying competition along with aforementioned advances in techno-innovation have exerted downward pressure on market prices.​[7]​ While this has diminished commercial profit margins, cost competitiveness will become increasingly vital for both wind and solar PV to compete against cheap shale gas in key markets. At present this particularly applied to the United States but Europe and East Asia could experience their own shale gas revolution in the not so distant future (IEA 2012).





5. The International Political Economy of Renewable Energy

5.1 Global Competition in Renewables

Fast growing, dynamic techno-innovatory sectors such as wind, solar and bioenergy are seen as integral to a broader ‘green economy’ development paradigm on which future world development could be based, as Chapter 2 will further discuss. Competition between nations and firms to secure stronger market position in RE industries has accordingly intensified over time, especially between those from the world’s three main economic regions of East Asia, Europe and North America. Recent speeches made by key political leaders reveal how important this has now become:

We're in a competition all around the world, and other countries – Germany, China, South Korea – they know that clean energy technology is what is going to help spur job creation and economic growth for years to come. And that's why we've got to make sure that we win that competition. I don't want the new breakthrough technologies and the new manufacturing taking place in China and India. I want all those new jobs right here … in the United States of America, with American workers, American know-how, American ingenuity.
US President Barack Obama, 6 May 2011, speech given at Allison Transmission Headquarters, Indianapolis, Indiana, cited in Morris et al (2012)

We need to… seize the commanding point of having the world’s best environmental technology, to win the race between the global industries
China Vice Premier Li Keqiang, speech given at the 11th Five-Year Plan Environmental Achievement Exhibition, 7th June 2011, Beijing​[8]​ 


Broadly speaking, global competition in renewables techno-innovation and production is intensifying. East Asia’s export-oriented economies view RE industries as presenting significant international market opportunities. The South Korean government has set a Green Growth Strategy target of capturing 10 percent of global market for renewable energy and other green technology products by 2020 (Chapter 2). This, though, is ultimately a competition between companies rather than countries. Moreover, in a globalising world economy of ever dense patterns of international business linkages the defining of ‘national’ winners and losers has become increasingly difficult and often meaningless. We have seen how East Asian and particularly Chinese firms appear to be strengthening their position in equipment manufacturing in many RE sectors. Their growing production capacity in this value-chain element (Table 1.4) can have significant benefits for upstream and downstream firms located both inside and outside the region. For example, China’s ability to increasingly mass produce competitively priced solar PV products has created more business demand for polysilicon suppliers upstream and system installers and maintainers downstream worldwide. This explains, for example, why coalitions of solar PV installation and maintenance firms in both the US (Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy) and EU (Alliance for Affordable Solar) lobbied against the application of trade barriers on low-priced Chinese imports.​[9]​ The expansion of China’s solar PV manufacturing base also helped support the US polysilicon industry which in the early 2010s supplied a quarter of the world’s demand for the material.​[10]​

The growth of international business linkages in RE industries has more generally made it often difficult to establish the demarcations of competition between firms themselves. These linkages can exist between companies working in the same part of the value-chain (e.g. Hanwha Solar One from South Korea and Q-Cells from Germany) or different parts of it, such as American firm First Solar’s joint venture announced in 2011 with utility-scale systems firm China Power.​[11]​ As Kirkegaard et al (2010) contend the global integration of renewable energy industries should create greater economies of scale and scope, thus further reducing unit costs and help drive future techno-innovation. Notwithstanding the complications of identifying the exact lines of international competition, rising renewable energy exports from East Asia has caused certain political economic conundrums in importing countries elsewhere. For instance, an important public policy debate in Germany has centred on whether the government’s FiT programme for encouraging further installation of solar PV systems is mainly benefitting Chinese manufacturers at the expense of their German rivals, most of which are unable to compete on price (Grau et al 2012). 

Taking the above points into account, international competition in renewables from a government policy perspective is primarily concerned with optimising as much value-added business activity as possible in home territory, whether generated by domestic or foreign firms. Chapters 2 and 3 examine how states around the world have increased their support for promoting R&D in renewable energy in order to develop stronger techno-innovation capacity. Firms that develop new technological breakthroughs in an industry enjoy first-mover advantages and can capture particular market segments or even create them. The world’s most developed economies (EU, Japan, US) still enjoy their historic advantages on this aspect of global renewables competition. However, the improving innovation capabilities of  China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia represents an important future competitive challenge to incumbent advanced economy firms on this front also, possibly to a similar extent as experienced in manufacturing competition over the last decade.


5.2 Trade Barriers and Disputes

The number of trade disputes over RE products has gradually risen. This has not focused so much on normally applied import tariffs as these have remained relatively low. In the wind energy industry, 2013 most favoured nation (MFN) duty rates for China, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam were zero percent, Taiwan and Malaysia 5 percent, South Korea 8 percent and Thailand 10 percent. This compared to the EU’s 3.3 percent, the US’s 2.6 percent, Australia’s 5 percent and India’s 7.6 percent rates. A similar pattern is evident for solar PV modules: zero percent MFN duties for Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, 2 percent for Taiwan, 7 percent for the Philippines, and 10 percent for China, Indonesia and Thailand, which compared to 1.5 percent for the US, 3.3 percent again for the EU, 5 percent Australia and 7.5 percent India. In addition, virtually all countries worldwide have zero rates for biomass wood pellets and low single digit rates for both hydropower and biomass power generation equipment, while somewhat higher rates apply in developing countries in the much smaller geothermal sector.​[12]​ 

However, non-tariff trade barriers, state subsidies and foreign investment barriers on renewables have been a recent issue of contention. Prime examples include domestic-level taxes and charges, obstructive customs procedures, local content requirements in manufacturing, the lack of mutual recognition of certification systems, and soft loans from state-owned banks (Kirkegaard et al 2010). In 2008, South Korea introduced a 19 percent surcharge on foreign PV goods although this was removed the year after. Chinese wind turbine producer, A-Power, experienced significant local resistance to its planned investment in Texas in 2009, and also was subject to ‘Buy American’ government procurement laws (Kirkegaard et al 2009). In 2008, China applied a local content requirement on wind turbine manufacturing, thus requiring firms producing in the country to source minimum supply quotients from local firms. At this time Beijing defended its policy using the infant industry argument often used by developing countries, stating that its aim was to both help establish a scaled up industry value-chain and enhance indigenous investment in  wind energy R&D.​[13]​ China removed its local content regulation in February 2011 after increasing pressure from the US and the EU. In the late 2000s, the Chinese government also imposed restrictions on foreign firms wishing to enter certain parts of the nation’s offshore wind industry (Soares 2009). Meanwhile, Japan undertook a complaint against the Canadian provincial government of Ontario at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) regarding its FiT scheme, which included a 60 percent local content rule. It also was alleged the scheme offered preferential treatment to certain investors, such as Korean firm Samsung that in January 2011 had announced plans to invest US$6.7 billion in constructed four new solar and wind energy clusters in Ontario.​[14]​ After the US government applied trade barriers of alleged state-subsidised exports of Chinese solar PV products in 2012, the Chinese government responded the following year by imposing its own barriers on polysilicon imports from US producers.​[15]​ The EU and China were locked in a similar dispute in 2013, the EU accusing the Chinese government of breaking WTO rules for allegedly providing cheap state loans, land, interest-free credit lines and tax breaks to the country’s PV manufacturers.​[16]​ While the level and scope of trade-related disputes over renewable energy products are still small by comparison with many other sectors, such disputes are likely to rise as green energy industries further expand and strategic rivalries within them intensify in the future.


5.3 Rare Earths and Resource Scarcity Issues

According to recent estimates, renewable and other green energy technologies currently account for around a fifth of total world consumption of critical materials that include cobalt and lithium, and also so called ‘rare earths’ that comprise a group of 17 elements possessing unique properties of a catalytic, magnetic or optical nature.​[17]​ For example, neodymium is an extremely magnetic rare earth mineral used in manufacturing advanced wind turbines.​[18]​ Many countries, including the US, were once very active in rare earth mining but significantly cut back or closed down operations altogether due to adverse environmental impacts arising from extraction and processing. China meanwhile ramped up its production capacity and by the early 2010s had a very strong monopoly position in global supplies of rare earths, reaching shares in the high 90s percent for most elements by 2010. At this time the country was thought to possess over a third of the world’s rare earth deposits but by 2012 had reportedly fallen to just around a quarter of global known reserves and its production shares had too correspondingly declined to some degree.​[19]​

Recent annual rates of growth in demand for rare earths have been between 10 to 15 percent, and consumption is projected to rise further as sectors like wind energy and solar PV continue to expand. From 2009 onwards, the Chinese government introduced a number of production caps and export restrictions on rare earths, explaining the decision was based on environmental and resource management factors. New pollution controls implemented towards the end of 2010 are thought to have further restricted rare earth mining. Prices for these commodities rose sharply in 2010 as a consequence, as much as 300 to 700 percent for certain elements. The restrictions also created supply-chain difficulties in RE industries. In early 2010, China reduced its rare earth exports by 72 percent and an additional 11 percent in early 2011.​[20]​ The export quota amounts were around a third of the capped national production total, leaving two-thirds for domestic consumption. Further restrictions were announced in 2012, and in March that year the US, Japan, the EU all confronted China at the WTO regarding the matter, claiming that Beijing’s actions were a breach of international trade rules. The US instigated a formal WTO dispute settlement case against China that was joined by other trade parties. 

Policy-makers around the world have responded to these developments in different ways. Large mineral rich nations – such as Brazil, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Tanzania, Kazakhstan, Russia and the US – have increased their rare earths exploration activities. Other nations, including Japan and South Korea, have increased their R&D efforts, focusing on improving material utilisation efficiency, using ferrite magnets as a substitute for neodymium magnets used in wind turbines, developing longer-term nanotechnology options for creating substitute composites for rare earths, and additional scientific fields. Japan has also invested in increasing its stockpiles of rare earths and other critical minerals, especially those essential to its solar PV sector such as lithium. Here also, Japan is investing heavily in recycling key materials and reprocessing used components. 









The governance of renewable energy generally concerns managing, promoting and optimising its development through various institutionalised means, including strategic planning, public policy, funding mechanisms, inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation, and generating shared data and information. At the national-level this can be viewed from two main perspectives. Firstly, state or public governance relates to how renewable energy is managed within the apparatus of national government, as manifest in the formation of RE policy (Chapter 3). In East Asia, managing renewable energy policy has been mostly assigned ‘division’ or ‘section’ status under the purview of government agencies (e.g. ministries, departments, bureaus, offices, etc.) that are more broadly responsible for energy or industry policy, and these may be embedded in turn within even larger economic development agencies. It is hence rare for renewable or green energy to be afforded a distinctive high profile institutionally within East Asian governments. Many of the region’s energy research institutes are state or quasi-state institutions, and perform important analytical services in the state’s governance structures on renewable energy development. 






Most of East Asia’s national renewable energy associations are members of their respective global associations. These include the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC), World Wind Energy Association (WWEA), International Solar Energy Society (ISES), International Hydropower Association (IHA), World Bioenergy Association (WBA), and International Geothermal Association (IGA). Each seeks to promote the worldwide development of their sector. From an historic perspective, institutional developments on promoting renewables at the global level date back to the early 1970s. The United Nations (UN) 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment is seen by many as the first agreement to address global environmental issues, which made reference to how ‘new energy’ solutions can alleviate anthropologically caused environmental problems. It took some time, however, for renewable energy to become firmly fixed on multilateral environmental and energy agendas. For example, G7 responses to the 1973/74 and 1979/80 oil crises primarily concerned how to mitigate oil dependencies through exploring coal and nuclear power alternatives. The first oil crisis led to the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA), based on membership of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and despite its still somewhat narrow international representation remains the world’s most important multilateral energy organisation. In the late 2000s, the IEA developed a renewable energy policy database that covers all countries with active RE policies.

The first global endeavour specifically focused on RE development was the 1981 United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy convened at Nairobi, Kenya. While this called for the UN and other multilateral forums to ardently promote renewables, no direct actions followed for some years. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, established in 1988) and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, created in 1992) were the next most important milestones in environmental and energy-related multilateralism. The IPCC is essentially an international science committee and key agency for examining the causes and effects of climate change, and advocating measures to address it. This has included comprehensive reports on renewable energy’s role in climate change mitigation strategies. The UNFCCC meanwhile is an agreement signed by more than 150 nations at the UN Conference for Environment and Development (first ‘Earth Summit’) in June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. The UNFCCC then became international law in 1994, leading also to annual international Conference of the Parties (COP) conferences. There was, though, no explicit role assigned to renewable energy in the UNFCCC text for tackling climate change, rather renewables were referred to only in the development policy context of the agreement. When Japan hosted COP3 in December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was added to the UNFCCC text, laying out a set of commitments to reduce carbon emissions over agreed time periods for each signatory to the agreement, and the specific instruments used to meet targets set. While Kyoto Protocol documentation has made relatively few and short references to date on how renewable energy can help achieve the agreement’s objectives (for example, see UNFCCC 2005, 2011) and has been somewhat criticised for doing so (Hirschl 2009), we discuss in Box 1.2 how its Clean Development Mechanism scheme formally launched in 2006 had helped fund over 6,000 new renewable energy projects in developing countries worldwide by 2013, the good majority of these situated in East Asia.


BOX 1.2   The Kyoto Protocol and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)

The Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC has made an important contribution to international efforts on renewable energy development, most critically through its Clean Development Mechanism scheme. The agreement had been signed by 84 countries by 1999, including all East Asian nation-states, and came into force in February 2005. By this time most national governments from the region had domestically ratified the Protocol, the exceptions being Brunei, North Korea and Singapore but who quite soon thereafter completed this process. By early 2014 there were 192 signatory parties. Of these, 42 signatory nations (developed countries and some ‘economies in transition’ such as Russia and Ukraine​[21]​) have legally binding targets on carbon emissions if they had ratified the Protocol, these forming the Annex I group. The general target set for these countries was to reduce their emissions by an average of 5.2 percent of their 1990 levels by the end of 2012. In addition, an Annex II group comprised 24 developed countries that are obliged to offer financial and technical aid to developing country parties in their efforts on climate change mitigation. Japan is the only East Asian country in either group, the rest of the region falling into the developing country category in which there are no legally binding obligations on CO2 emissions, although they are expected under the agreement to set their own future emissions targets unilaterally. Many East Asian countries have set such targets (see Table 3.2, page XX??). After the first commitment period had passed in December 2012, a second period up to 2020 has been incorporated into an updated and amended Kyoto Protocol but at the time of writing this had not yet legally entered into force. There were 37 countries by early 2014 that had committed to this second period. This excluded Japan who in December 2010 announced it would not commit to the Protocol beyond 2012, although of course this may change in the future.

Parties with Protocol commitments are supposed to meet their emission targets primarily by the use of national measures. This has relevance for government RE policy although Kyoto does not set any formal guidelines or stipulations here. To augment national level efforts, the agreement introduced three market-based mechanisms with the aim of creating the basis of a global ‘carbon market’. The international Emissions Trading mechanism “allows countries that have emission [reduction] units to spare – emissions permitted them but not ‘used’ – to sell this excess capacity to countries that are over their targets”.​[22]​ Under a second mechanism, Joint Implementation, an Annex I party can fund an emission reduction project in another party from this group, this contributing towards the former’s emissions targets. It was expected that most of these projects would occur in the ‘economies in transition’ sub-group to assist their efforts on replacing dilapidated coal-fired power plants with cleaner and more efficient technology, which in some cases has included renewables. 

However, the most relevant mechanism to renewable energy under Kyoto is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which became fully operational in 2006. The CDM facilitates emission reduction projects funded by Annex I countries to take place in non-Annex I countries, leading to the former earning tradable certified emission reduction (CER) credits (one tonne of CO2 per credit) that contribute towards achieving their Protocol targets. One of the key advantages of the CDM is that emission reductions are achieved at a much lower global cost by financing projects in developing countries where energy generation costs are lower than in the developed world. Similarly, the technical scope for emission reductions in developing countries is much greater given their lower energy efficiency levels. By use of an illustrative example, the construction of a wind farm to replace an old inefficient coal-fired power station with outdated emission control technology located somewhere in developing East Asia would yield a much higher investment return in cost per/tonne emission reduction terms than if a modern coal power plant was being decommissioned somewhere in Japan, West Europe or the United States. 

The CDM is also the world’s first environmental investment and credit scheme to operate on a global scale with 161 countries engaged in the scheme by 2012 and helping mobilise up to US$215.4 billion of investment in developing countries by that year. The UNFCCC claims that the mechanism has reduced carbon emissions by over one billion tonnes (UNFCCC 2012), or about 3 percent of the annual global emissions total (Table 1.1). By September 2013, 8,822 CDM projects had been either fully registered or in the registration ‘pipeline’ process, and 70.2 percent of these concerned new renewable energy installations (6,192 projects in total), this being made up 30.0 percent wind energy, 25.9 percent hydropower, 9.6 percent bioenergy, 4.6 percent solar and 0.1 percent for tidal and mixed renewables (Table 1.5). The UNFCCC estimates that by around this time the Mechanism had created an extra 120GW of installed renewables capacity (UNFCCC 2012), which if accurate represented 8.2 percent of the global total. Moreover, most of this additional capacity has occurred in East Asia. By September 2013, the region accounted for 60.3 percent of the renewable energy CDM project total, this being heavily skewed towards China which alone accounted for 52.0 percent, as well as 45.0 of all CDM projects by this time. Table 1.5 provides further details on the CDM’s contribution to renewable energy development in East Asia. Vietnam has been another important CDM beneficiary, accounting for the same number of renewable energy project registrations as Africa, the Middle East, East Europe, Central Asia and other Asia and Pacific (minus India) combined. In most East Asian cases, renewables comprised the majority project total, although notably for Southeast Asia’s largest countries other clean development technologies (e.g. emission abatement, carbon emission capture, forestation, green transportation systems and energy efficiency) were collectively more important. Japan has funded the fourth largest number of CDM projects (8.3 percent, 578 projects) among Annex I countries, behind Britain, Switzerland and the Netherlands and slipping from an earlier held third ranking of CDM investors. The scheme has enabled developing East Asian countries to secure renewable energy technology transfers, improve management performance levels and foster indigenous RE capabilities over the long-term, as reportedly demonstrated in China’s wind energy sector (GWEC 2010b).

The CDM ‘additionality’ clause requires that a project must lead to a net emissions reduction greater than would have occurred in the most plausible alternative scenario to the proposed project activity. Proving additionality obviously becomes harder when developing country governments are offering an ever wider range of incentives to promote decarbonisation across various sectors, thus presenting many ‘alternative options’ to CDM projects (Pechak et al 2011). The mechanism has also come under increasing criticism. Lloyd and Subbarao (2008) were early observers of how the majority of CDM projects appear to be concentrated in larger developing countries like China, India and Brazil (the three top ranked host countries accounting collectively for three-quarters of the projects total by 2013) to the extent that smaller nations lacking the supportive infrastructure have failed to attract CDM investment. On another scale-related issue, high transaction costs associated with the CDM market have tended to favour large, high CER volume projects leading to small community-based project proposals in rural or remote areas – where the socio-economic needs are more often than not the greatest – being deemed less commercially viable and non-funded (Bagliani et al 2010). Furthermore, it is somewhat incongruous for East Asia’s relatively well developed and high-income nations of Singapore and South Korea to actually host CDM projects when arguably they should be instead funding them in developing countries. 





At the 2000 Okinawa G7 summit hosted by the Japanese government, national leaders discussed a British government proposal to create a special task force for promoting renewables worldwide (Kirton 2006). As it transpired, the remit of the subsequently formed task force focused more on development co-operation than energy system transformation, and while its 2001 report was much commended by the international community the task force was wound up soon thereafter, with no momentum on renewables carried forward in subsequent G7 summits. A year later at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD, or second ‘Earth Summit’) held in Johannesburg in 2002, renewable energy was afforded greater attention than at the 1992 Rio summit. While these talks failed to meet their main objective of establishing a general consensus on setting sector-specific RE development targets, it helped lay the groundwork for subsequent International Renewable Energy Conferences (IRECs), the first being held at Bonn in 2004, followed by Beijing (2005), Washington DC (2008), Delhi (2010) and Abu Dhabi (2014). The IRECs have brought together between 80 to over 150 countries to discuss common challenges on developing renewable energy policies, capacities and techno-innovation, further helping institutionalise global dialogue and co-operation in these fields. 

An outcome of the 2004 Bonn IREC was the establishment of the International Renewable Energy Alliance, a new lobby coalition formed between the aforementioned IGA, IHA, ISES, WBA and WWEA sectoral groups. Soon thereafter this became a formal organisation and was renamed the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, or REN21, with additional collaborative help from the UN Environmental Programme, the IEA and the German Technical Assistance agency. REN21’s prime aims are to promote policy development, dialogue and analysis on renewable energy issues based on multi-stakeholder participation. Since 2005 it has published annual Global Status Reports that are the most important comprehensive analyses on renewable energy development worldwide produced on a regular basis, providing key sources of data intelligence that draws on the work of its multiple partner agencies. At the ill-fated COP15 conference held at Copenhagen in December 2009, REN21 proposed the creation of a global investment fund for renewables but failed to receive sufficient support. The organisation continues to lobby for this initiative, with a core element of the fund being a possible global FiT scheme. Another new hybrid organisation, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), was formed in 2002 comprising representatives from the regulatory, business, financial institution and non-government organisation communities that advocates improved access to renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. By 2013, REEEP’s membership had expanded to 45 national governments (including Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and South Korea from East Asia) and the organisation had established two regional secretariats, one in China the other in India.

The most important recent institutional development from a global governance perspective was the foundation of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009. It became fully functional in 2011 has its headquarters in Masdar City, Abu Dhabi. IRENA is the now the world’s principal international institution for promoting renewable energy and its membership had grown to 131 members by June 2014, including from East Asia: Brunei, China, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore and South Korea.​[23]​ The main tasks of IRENA are to provide advice and support for governments on policy issues, capacity-building, finance generation and technology transfer, information sharing, and improving co-ordinated actions across international institutions working to promote renewables generally. Japan is the second largest contributor to IRENA’s core budget. A World Council for Renewable Energy (WCRE) was also formed in 2001 as essentially a lobby group for promoting the sector generally, which also strongly advocated the creation of IRENA. In Chapter 2, we outline additional efforts to promote renewable energy development through new ‘green growth’ multilateral agendas and institutions that emerged largely in response to the 2008/09 global financial crisis.


6.3 Regional Level in East Asia

Regional co-operation and diplomacy on renewable energy issues in East Asia has remained very low key. Although the region hosts a growing number of conferences and business networking events on renewables, inter-governmental dialogue on the subject has been negligible and institution-building extremely limited. Even the region’s most established and fullest functioning regional organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – has afforded relatively little attention to the subject. The ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Co-operation (APAEC) 2004-2009 did, though, initiate numerous minor development projects with the help of German government assistance, and for its ten member states to reach a collective 10 percent target on installed renewables power capacity. Under APAEC 2010-2015, this was further target raised to 15 percent by 2015 but as Table 1.1 shows half of these countries had already surpassed this by 2009, before the Action Plan became operational​[24]​ (ASEAN 2011). A separate action plan was devised with the aim of realising this and additional highly generalised goals on introducing clearer policies and programmes on RE development for improving commercialization, investment, market and trade potentials of renewable energy technologies. However, APAEC remained largely aspirational on these areas, lacking detail on what exact institutional mechanisms and funding would be deployed to help reach the goals set. Other instances of regional-level dialogue have occurred within the ASEAN Plus Three regional framework (the ‘Three’ being China, Japan and South Korea), leading to special forum meetings on renewables but with no real substantive institutional or other kinds of results.

Arguably the most important contribution thus far made at the East Asia regional level on renewable energy development has been made from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), this originating in the early 2000s under its Promotion of Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency, and	 Greenhouse Gas Abatement Project that established loan facilities for investment in RE sectors. The ADB’s Energy Efficiency Initiative was superseded in 2009 by its broader Clean Energy Programme that by 2012 had helped create over US$2 billion of new investment in renewable energy installations and technological advancements (ADB 2012a). Prominent sector-specific programmes also regionally managed by the Bank include the Asia Solar Energy Initiative, the Quantum Leap in Wind and the Small Wind Initiative. The ADB is also involved in the Climate Investment Funds programme that comprises a series of financing instruments to promote low carbon and climate-resilient development projects. The ADB generally has become a key advocate of low carbon development in East Asia region and the wider Asia continent, and estimates that over a quarter of its approved loans support projects that are in some way clean energy related. In the private sector, the only known sectoral business group formed at the regional level relevant to East Asia is the Asian Photovoltaic Industries Association that was established in 2009 and based in Singapore. However, outside Europe such organisations are quite rare. 







Renewable energy has a vital role to play in the low carbon future of East Asia and the wider world. The energy-intensive nature of East Asia’s contemporary economic development, driven by rapid industrialisation, makes renewables especially critical to the region. Renewable energy development in East Asia is also critical to the international community as a whole given the region’s growing impact on global energy security and climate change. China’s burgeoning economic development in particular is presenting crucial challenges on both these fronts but the country is too making vitally useful contributions to the worldwide expansion of renewables. Other East Asian countries have in addition become important players in certain RE sectors whether in terms of techno-innovation, production, installed capacity, investment, trade and finance.

Three main inter-related drivers behind renewable energy development in East Asia were proposed, namely: (i) environmental and sustainable development imperatives; (ii) energy security; (iii) and emerging strategic industries. Renewables are being promoted by the region’s governments as a means to address increasingly serious multi-level environmental challenges facing the region, as well as to place its countries on more sustainable, low carbon development trajectories. These sources of energy are also essentially indigenous in nature, helping mitigate the chronic energy import dependencies already confronting East Asia’s largest and most developed economies. The region’s domestic fossil fuel reserves are at the same time fast depleting, thus renewables are providing solutions for many kinds of energy supply risk. In addition, many RE sectors are now viewed as emerging industries of the 21st century, and hence critical to creating future prosperity, employment and income.

From historic and global perspectives, it was noted that renewable energy sources have been used for a long time in human society but, aside from hydropower, the deployment of their modern technological forms was still very limited by the end of the 20th century. Renewables comprise a broad spectrum of different energy technologies and most recent development patterns have varied significantly. Since the early 2000s, wind, solar and bioenergy have expanded rapidly, and are now scaled up and commercialised energy sectors that are increasingly able to compete with fossil fuels on power generation. East Asia has been at the forefront of the global renewable energy development, accounting for around a quarter of RE generated electricity worldwide. This has corresponded to the region’s burgeoning public and private investment in renewables, which by the early 2010s accounted for approximately two-fifths of the world total. However, the future expansion of renewable energy in East Asia and worldwide faces a number of key challenges, constraints and contentious issues relating to intermittent power problems, non-dispatchable nature of many renewables, infrastructure development, and a number of environmental and sustainability predicaments. There are also important socio-technical and socio-cultural matters to consider if society is to make greater use of renewable energy.

Patterns of renewable energy techno-innovation have varied greatly across the different sectors. The most significant advances have occurred in the two largest non-hydro sectors – wind and solar PV – helping reduce production and operating costs and raise technical efficiency levels. Firms from East Asia’s more developed economies are among the technology leaders in renewables, and the region’s developing countries have benefitted from cross-border technology transfers. East Asian governments are supporting the techno-innovatory endeavours of home-based firms for strategic industry reasons. The region is already the main production hub for RE products, a position likely to strengthen in the future due to both expected strategic government support and dynamic private entrepreneurship. However, high rates of wind and solar PV production capacity growth, most notably in China, has caused overcapacity and other problems, part of the significant structural changes that have recently occurred in both sectors. Key shifts in international trade patterns for renewable energy products were also examined in this chapter.

East Asia’s emergence as the world’s primary manufacturing centre for renewable energy products has been the cause of competitive tension in its economic relations with the United States, European Union and other key trade partners. However, it was noted that deepening global business linkages across the value chains of industries like wind energy and solar PV make it increasingly difficult to establish the demarcation of international competition between companies and between countries. For example, the expansion of East Asia’s productive capacity to make affordable solar PV cells and modules has helped create new business for upstream and downstream companies in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, international disputes in RE industries have been on the rise since the late 2000s as a number of governments have imposed various types of trade barriers. Similar tensions have arisen over supply shortages and controls placed on rare earths and other critical materials that are vital in the production of renewables and other green energy products. 
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